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SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
CPLR 7503(c): Failure to apply for stay within ten-day period held to
concede not only arbitrability but also adversary's choice of arbitrator.
CPLR 7503(c) was enacted to give stability to arbitration awards. 59
Until recently, it provided that, unless a party receiving a notice of
intention to arbitrate moves to stay within ten days, he will be "pre-
cluded from objecting that a valid agreement was not made or has not
been complied with."'160 Recognizing that the rigors of a ten-day time
limit proved unduly harsh for the unwary party served, the Legisla-
ture, upon recommendation of the Judicial Conference,' 61 has ex-
tended the moving time to twenty days.162 Courts, too, have been atten-
tive to the need for keeping in check attempts to abuse this provision.163
159 Formerly, a party could await the outcome of an arbitration proceeding and, if
the award proved unfavorable, contest the arbitrability of the agreement before a court
in a subsequent enforcement proceeding. See Matter of Knickerbocker Ins. Co., 28 N.Y.2d
57, 268 N.E.2d 758, 320 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1971). discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST.
JOHN's L. REV. 500, 531 (1971). Sturges, Some General Standards for a State Arbitration
Statute, 7 ARB. J. (n.s.) 194, 197-98 (1957). Even so, the original draft of CPLR 7503 did
not contain subdivision (c). A provision for speedy motion to compel arbitration was
already available, and subd. (b) provided that only a party who had not participated in
the arbitration and who had not been served with a motion to compel arbitration could
move to stay on the ground that an agreement did not exist or had not been complied
with. SECOND REP. 130. Apparently, the notice of intention provision was restored (former
section 1458(2) of the CPA had a similar provision) because of criticism from the bar.
Falls, Arbitration, 148 N.Y.L.J. 4, Aug. 15, 1962, at 4, col. 2.
160Subd. (c) of CPLR 7503 should be distinguished from subd. (a) of this section,
which concerns an application to compel arbitration. The latter authorizes the court,
before deciding whether to order arbitration to proceed, to make three threshold deter-
minations: (1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate; (2) whether it was com-
plied with; and (3) whether the claim sought to be arbitrated is barred by the statute of
limitations. Under subd. (c), however, it is for the adverse party to raise these objections,
and to do so within the specified twenty days, or be denied the opportunity of having
them raised in court.
161 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 59-63. The Judicial Conference reasoned that the
twenty-day provision is short enough to permit expeditious settlement of disputes in
commercial cases, but at the same time is now consistent with the time provisions of the
CPLR relating to service of answers and motions.
162 L. 1973, ch. 1028, at 1883, eff. Sept. 1, 1973. See text accompanying notes 155-58
supra.
163See 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 7503(c), supp. commentary at 168 (1972). Compare
Frame v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 31 App. Div. 2d 872, 297 N.Y.S.2d 247 (3rd Dep't 1969)
(the question of whether insured's son was covered by a policy could be raised by
the insurer although it had failed to move within ten days, because the disputed issue
was not a threshold question to which the preclusion of subd. (c) applied) with Schafran
& Finkel, Inc. v. Lowenstein &- Sons, Inc., 280 N.Y. 164, 19 N.E.2d 1005 (1939), discussed in
The Quarterly Survey, 39 ST. JOHN's L. Rrv. 180, 239 (1964) (a party who did not respond to
a notice of intention to arbitrate was not precluded from raising the issue of a valid
arbitrable agreement after ten days where the notice was insufficient to apprise him of
the consequences of failure to so move; although statutory amendment of subd. (c) rem-
edied this situation, the case points out that where a literal reading of 7503(c) would lead
to patent injustice, the court can refuse to give homage to its literal phraseology, and
look to its underlying intent) and Matter of Hesslein & Co. v. Greenfield, 281 N.Y. 26,
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However, in the recent case of Crawford v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 64 the Appellate Division, Fourth Department,
gave a broad interpretation to the ten-day preclusionary rule. In this
case, a salesman brought an action to recover commissions from his
employer, Merrill, Lynch, a member of the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE). The employer moved under CPLR 7503(a) to stay the action
and proceed to arbitration before the NYSE pursuant to an alleged
agreement made between the employee and the Exchange. 65 Before
this motion was acted upon by the court, the salesman served under
CPLR 7503(c) a notice of intention to arbitrate, but named as arbitra-
tor the American Arbitration Association (AAA). Although the appel-
lant conceded that the underlying agreement specified that arbitration
be before the NYSE, 16 the court, by a three to two decision, neverthe-
less held that, by failing to move to stay within ten days, Merrill, Lynch
was barred from raising the objection to the arbitrator named in the
notice of intention. It reversed Special Term's direction to arbitrate
before the NYSE, and ordered that arbitration proceed before the AAA.
Surely, it is straining statutory purpose to absurdity to require a
party to move to stay arbitration of an agreement when he, himself, has
pending before a court a motion, under an alternative provision of
article 75, to compel arbitration of that very same matter.167
22 N.E.2d 149 (1939) and Glasser v. Price, 35 App. Div. 2d 98, 818 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2nd Dep't
1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN's L. R1v. 501, 528 (1971) (a stranger to
the underlying contract could not be held to a ten-day limitation imposed by 7503(c))
and Ledo Realty Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 43 Misc. 2d 380, 251 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct.
Schenectady County 1964), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 39 ST. JOHN'S L. RLv. 180, 239
(1964) (where a motion was made under CPLR 7503(a) to compel arbitration, a party
could raise the question of the validity of the underlying agreement, even though he had
failed to respond within 10 days to a notice of intention previously served under subd. (c)
regarding the same agreement).
164 41 App. Div. 2d 112, 341 N.Y.S.2d 673 (4th Dep't 1973).
165 Although the respondent, Merrill, Lynch was not a party to it, the contract did
provide that controversies between Crawford and any member of the Exchange would be
settled pursuant to rules of the Exchange, which in turn specified that a non-member
could compel a member to arbitrate a dispute before the NYSE, although apparently
the member could not compel a non-member to do so. Id. at 114, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 675. In
any event, the terms of the contract did not ostensibly affect the legal outcome, both
majority and dissent asserted, although they both construed the agreement to lend support
to their viewpoint. Id. at 114, 116, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 675, 677 (dissent).
166Id. at 115, 841 N.YS.2d at 676 (dissent). The appellant did, however, offer reasons
(ignored by the majority) to justify avoidance.
167 The appellant's position was untenable on other grounds. The fact that he orig-
inally commenced an action at law would normally act as a waiver of any future right to
seek arbitration. Matter of Zimmerman v. Cohen, 235 N.Y. 15, 139 N.E.2d 764 (1923);
Sussman v. Goldberg, 28 Misc. 2d 1070, 210 N.Y.2d 912 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1960)
(plaintiff brought an action at law and while it was still pending served a demand for
arbitration, which the court refused to grant); Nagy v. Arcas Brass & Iron Co., 213 App.
Div. 830, 208 N.Y.S. 906 (2nd Dep't 1925), aff'd, 242 N.Y. 97, 150 N.E. 614 (1926) (a
refusal to arbitrate upon demand by adverse party constitutes such a waiver).
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As the dissent pointed out, the issue in this case was not whether
an arbitrable agreement existed, but rather who was to conduct the
arbitration. This issue was not the sort of threshold determination in-
tended by the drafters to fall within the preclusions of CPLR 7503(c).16"
By including objection to choice of arbitrator within the caveat of this
provision'69 the court has created a precedent open to abuse. A party
might now not only force arbitration of an issue with no valid arbitrable
basis, but choose his own arbitrator to determine the outcome as well.
This is an unwarranted extension of an already stringent procedural
obstacle.
JUDICIARY LAW
Judiciary Law § 217-a: Legislature sanctions administrative vacatur
of default judgments.
Section 217-a has been added to the Judiciary Law,1'70 giving an
administrative judge, a presiding justice or a judge in charge of the ad-
ministration of any court of record the power to bring a proceeding to
set aside default judgments which appear to have been obtained by
"fraud, misrepresentation, illegality, unconscionability, lack of due
service, violation of law, or other illegalities .... "171 The remedies
available in the proceeding include (1) a vacatur or stay of execution of
such judgments (2) a vacatur of summonses and complaints from which
illegal judgments may result (3) a decree of restitution of any payments
collected from judgment debtors, and (4) any other relief deemed to be
just and proper. The proceeding may be initiated when the judge or
justice has satisfied himself that default judgments were illegally ob-
tained in "a number of instances."' 72 Notice must be given to the
parties or their attorneys and the proceeding must be determined by a
judge other than the initiating judge or justice. This provision gives
approval to a practice initiated in 1971 by Justice Edward Thompson,
Administrative Judge of the New York City Civil Court, which has
already resulted in the vacating of thousands of default judgments.1'73
168 See note 160 supra.
160 CPLR 7504 provides that upon application of either party, the court may appoint
an arbitrator where an agreement has failed to name one or where a dispute has arisen
on this point. The facts of this case justify application of this provision, and the mere
fact that the provision exists offers some support for the argument that choosing an
arbitrator is an issue independent of the determination of the threshold issues of section
7503.
170 L. 1973, ch. 138, at 163, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 See McLaughlin, New York Trial Practice, 169 N.Y.L.J. III, June 8, 1973, at 4,
col. 2.
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